Drones represent a growing and underestimated threat to critical infrastructure in Slovakia. It doesn’t matter whether a journalist, an amateur, or a saboteur is flying—drones simply must not be allowed over protected facilities. Effective defense must combine timely detection, clear identification, and a rapid response.
Why a drone near critical infrastructure is always a problem
Discussing the pilot’s motives is only of secondary interest; the first principle is that a drone in a prohibited area is a risk. Even “innocent” attempts or reconnaissance provide the attacker with data and experience for later malicious activity. Moreover, drones can fly low, quietly, and along a preprogrammed route, allowing them to systematically “probe” their path to the target.
A widespread myth claims that autonomous flight rules out a radio footprint. In practice, however, drones often transmit video or, at some phase of the flight, communicate with the controller, and thus leave detectable signals. For this reason, protection should proceed on the assumption that even an “autonomous” incursion can be detected.
Why radar isn’t enough and what to add
Radar alone is limited at low altitudes and in rugged terrain by reflections, shadowing, and environmental “noise.” Moreover, many commercial systems rely on “threat libraries”—i.e., known drone profiles—which are updated with delays and cost considerable money. That’s like vaccinating against diseases that are already circulating in a new variant.
Effective protection therefore combines multiple layers: radio detection and direction finding, visual or video confirmation for evidentiary material, and finally the safe neutralization of the drone. It is also crucial to identify not only the drone but also its origin and operator—without that, the situation cannot be resolved legally and in terms of security.
The Mochovce case: planning, geolocation, and the reality of the terrain
In practice, wideband radio detection has proven effective—one that does not look only at “common” frequencies, but scans the entire relevant spectrum and quickly captures atypical communications as well. Simulation tools help design sensor placement and verify coverage, but they do not replace on-site reconnaissance—the model does not know current vegetation, local interference, or real terrain masking. The goal is for the response unit to have a timely alert and clear instructions on where to deploy.
The surroundings of the Mochovce nuclear power plant are hilly and forested, which plays into the hands of low-flying drones and makes life difficult for radar. A network of multiple sensors at an appropriate height enables active 3D geolocation—with a sufficient number of points it will determine the position of the drone and the operator with high accuracy. Such a system improves the protection of the specific site and, at the same time, can contribute to broader airspace security if integrated into government systems.
