APT ÚTOKY V EURÓPE

Robert Lipovský

Senior Malware Researcher



UŽÍVAJTE SI BEZPEČNEJŠIE TECHNOL<u>ÓGIE</u>™_____






Advanced Persistent Threat



Sandworm





GRU HACKERS' DESTRUCTIVE MALWARE AND INTERNATIONAL CYBER ATTACKS

Conspiracy to Commit an Offense Against the United States; False Registration of a Domain Name; Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud; Wire Fraud; Intentional Damage to Protected Computers; Aggravated Identity Theft







Pavel Valeryevich Frolow





Anatoliy Sergeyevich Kovalev Artem Valeryevich Ochichenko

Petr Nikolayevich Pliskin

CAUTION

On October 15, 2020, a federal grand jury sitting in the Western District of Pennsylvania returned an indictment against six Russian military intelligence officrs for their a laged rd s in tar geting and comp rom sing comp ut ar systems worldwide, including those relating to critical infrastructure in Ukraine, a political campaign in France, and the country of Georgia; international victims of the "NotP etya" malware attacks (including critical infrastructure providers); and international victims associated with the 2018 Winter Olympic Games and investigations of nerve agent attacks that have been publicly attributed to the Russian government. The indictment charges the defendants, Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko, Sergey Vladimirovich Detistov, Pavel Valeryevich Frolov, Anatoliy Sergeyevich Kovalev, Artem Valeryevich Ochichenko, and Petr Nikolayevich Pliskin, with a computer hacking conspiracy intended to deploy destructive malware and take other disruptive actions, for the strategic benefit R ussia, through unauthorized access to victims' computers. The indictment also charges these defendants with false registration of a domain name, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud, intentional damage to protected computers, aggravated identity theft, and aiding and abetting those crimes. The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania issued a federal arrest warrant for each of these defendants upon the grand jury's return of the indictment.

SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS, AN INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT RISK, AND AN ESCAPE RISK

If you have any information concerning these individuals, please contact your local FBI offic, σ the nearest American Embassy or Consulate.





Ē Ďalšie −

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
20. októbra 2020 15:24 🧳 Hekeri a kyberbezpečnosť 🗳 Ruskí špióni

Útočili ako zo sci-fi knihy: vypli elektrinu, zasiahli voľby aj olympiádu. Ruskí hekeri z jednotky 74455



MIREK TÓDA + Zapnúť články e-mailom

*



Hekeri z ruskej rozviedky GRU sa ukázali ako fanúšikovia seriálu Mr. Robot. Pri útokoch použili obrázok masky fsociety – fiktívnej anarchistickej hekerskej skupiny. Foto – americké ministerstvo spravodlivosti

Prehľad najdesivejších útokov obávanej hekerskej skupiny z Moskvy.

SANDWORM INTRUSION SET CAMPAIGN TARGETING CENTREON SYSTEMS


DESCRIPTION AND REMEDIATION

1.0 27/01/2021




TLP:WHITE





Cyber Kill Chain





От: niipulm@tut.by <niipulm@tut.by> Кому: <minprom4@minprom.gov.by> Написано: 12 февраля 2020 г., 15:07:48 Тема: Коронавирус в Беларуси подтвержден Палка: Входящие / minprom4@minprom.gov.by

По данным на этот момент в Беларуси 6 пациентов с диагностированным новым вирусом (Минск - 3, Витебск - 2, Борисов - 1).

>Приказ министра элравоохранения Владимира Караника<

Симптомы коронавируса напоминают симптомы простуды или гриппа: это насморк, кашель, боль в грудной клетке, конъюнктивит, повышенная температура, головная боль, слабость, тошнота и даже диарея.

Предоставьте информацию об угрозе своим сотрудником.

Телефон "горячей" линии +375 (29) 156-85-65.

MITRE | ATT&CK°

ID: T1195

T1195.003

439

Version: 1.2

Tactic: Initial Access

Contributors: Veeral Patel

Created: 18 April 2018

Last Modified: 13 October 2020

Sub-techniques: T1195.001, T1195.002,

Data Sources: File monitoring, Web proxy

CAPEC ID: CAPEC-437, CAPEC-438, CAPEC-

Version Permalink

Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS

Search Q

		Home > Techniques > Enterprise > Supply Chain Compromise	
TECHNIQUES			
Enterprise	^	Supply Chain Compromise	
Reconnaissance	~		
Resource	~	Sub-techniques (3)	~
Development		Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consume	er for
Initial Access	^	the purpose of data or system compromise.	
Drive-by Compromise		Supply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:	
Exploit Public-Facin Application	g	 Manipulation of development tools 	
External Remote Services		 Manipulation of a development environment Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private) 	
Hardware Additions		 Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms 	
Phishing	~	 Compromised/infected system images (multiple cases of removable media infected at the factory) 	[1] [2]
Replication Through	ı –	 Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions 	
Removable Media		 Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors 	
Supply Chain	^	Shipment interdiction	
Compromise		While supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, attackers looking to) gain
Compromise		execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or up	date
Software		channels. ^[3] ^[4] ^[5] Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set ^[6] or malicious software may be distrib	outed
Dependencies and		to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims. ^{[3] [5]} Popular open	l
Development Tools		source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to	add
Compromise		malicious code to users of the dependency. ^[7]	
Software Supply			

welivesecurity west

Lazarus supply-chain attack in South Korea ovel Lazarus supply-chain attack leveraging WIZVERA VeraPort

welivesecurity west

Operation SignSight: Supply-chain attack against a certification authority in Southeast

ESET researchers have uncovered a supply-chain attack on the website of a government in Ignacio Sanmillan Matthieu Faou

Operation NightScout: supply-chain attack rargets online gaming in welivesecurity west

welivesecurity west

Operation StealthyTrident: corporate software under attack


ruberespionage operation targeting

Menu


LuckyMouse, TA428, HyperBro, Tmanger and ShadowPad linked in Mongolian supply-chain attack




Rast RDP brute-force pokusov od začiatku pandémie




Cyber Kill Chain









Ďakujem!

@Rockouter

@Robert_Lipovsky



